minae if he
be of the fourth class.
The so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all admiration. He
knew that the men of his own time believed and had no doubt that there
were Gods, which was a reasonable belief in those days, because most men
were the sons of Gods, and according to tradition he was one himself. He
appears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man, but
to the Gods only, and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided
by him. For he made the two parties take an oath respecting the points
in dispute, and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now
that a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence
of the Gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and the
opinion of most men, and of the worst men, is that in return for a small
sacrifice and a few flattering words they will be their accomplices in
purloining large sums and save them from many terrible punishments, the
way of Rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of justice; for as
the opinions of men about the Gods are changed, the laws should also
be changed--in the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do
away with the oaths of the parties on either side--he who obtains leave
to bring an action should write down the charges, but should not add
an oath; and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the
magistrates in writing, and not swear; for it is a dreadful thing to
know, when many lawsuits are going on in a state, that almost half the
people who meet one another quite unconcernedly at the public meals and
in other companies and relations of private life are perjured. Let the
law, then, be as follows: A judge who is about to give judgment shall
take an oath, and he who is choosing magistrates for the state shall
either vote on oath or with a voting tablet which he brings from
a temple; so too the judge of dances and of all music, and the
superintendents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, and
any matters in which, as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be
gained by a false oath; but all cases in which a denial confirmed by
an oath clearly results in a great advantage to the taker of the oath,
shall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit, and the
presiding judges shall not permit either of them to use an oath for the
sake of persuading, nor to call down curses on himself and his race, nor
to use unseemly suppli
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