, as you declare
yourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not
able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what
is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of
things which I have given you?

CLEINIAS: We cannot, Stranger.

ATHENIAN: Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where
it is to be found?

CLEINIAS: For example, where?

ATHENIAN: For example, we were saying that there are four kinds of
virtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one.

CLEINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: And further, all four of them we call one; for we say that
courage is virtue, and that prudence is virtue, and the same of the two
others, as if they were in reality not many but one, that is, virtue.

CLEINIAS: Quite so.

ATHENIAN: There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ
from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. But
there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the
rest of them by the single name of virtue.

CLEINIAS: How do you mean?

ATHENIAN: I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let us
distribute the subject into questions and answers.

CLEINIAS: Once more, what do you mean?

ATHENIAN: Ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then
again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom. I
will tell you how that occurs: One of them has to do with fear; in this
the beasts also participate, and quite young children--I mean courage;
for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. But
without reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and
understanding soul; it is of a different nature.

CLEINIAS: That is true.

ATHENIAN: I have now told you in what way the two are different, and
do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same. Suppose
that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered
me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are
four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things
which have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists
in knowing the name only and not the definition. Can he who is good
for anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and
glorious truths are concerned?

CLEINIAS: I suppose not.

ATHENIAN: And is there anything greater to the legislator and the
guardian of the law