the truth about them, and to be able
to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of
what is and of what is not well, according to nature?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Is not the knowledge of the Gods which we have set forth with
so much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge--to know that they
are, and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? We do
indeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice of
the laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to
obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; our
city is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or
to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man,
and has not laboured at these things.
CLEINIAS: It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent
about such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things
honourable should be put away from him.
ATHENIAN: Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to
believe in the Gods, as we have already stated?
CLEINIAS: What are they?
ATHENIAN: One is the argument about the soul, which has been already
mentioned--that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which
motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the other was an
argument from the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things
under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe. If a man look
upon the world not lightly or ignorantly, there was never any one so
godless who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the many
imagine. For they think that those who handle these matters by the help
of astronomy, and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become
godless, because they see, as far as they can see, things happening by
necessity, and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good.
CLEINIAS: But what is the fact?
ATHENIAN: Just the opposite, as I said, of the opinion which once
prevailed among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in
those days men wondered about them, and that which is now ascertained
was then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of
them--that if they had been things without soul, and had no mind, they
could never have moved with numerical exactness so wonderful; and even
at that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the
orderer of the universe. But these same persons again mi
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