Seminary at Princeton (see p. 30, memorial);
remarkable interviews and correspondence of Judge B. F. Wade (see pp.
23-26 of memorial).

That this campaign prevented the recognition of Southern independence
by its fatal effects on the Confederate States is shown by letters
from Hon. C. M. Clay (see pp. 40-43 of memorial), and by his letters
from St. Petersburgh; also those of Mr. Adams and Mr. Dayton from
London and Paris (see pp. 100-102 of memorial).

That the campaign defeated National bankruptcy, then imminent, and
opened the way for the system of finance to defend the Federal cause,
is shown by the debates of the period in both Houses of Congress (see
utterances of Mr. Spalding, Mr. Diven, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, Mr.
Roscoe Conkling, Mr. John Sherman, Mr. Henry Wilson, Mr. Fessenden,
Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Foster, Mr. Garrett Davis, Mr. John J. Crittendon,
etc., found for convenient reference in appendix to memorial, pp.
47-59. Also therein the opinion of the English press as to why the
Union could not be restored).

The condition of the struggle can best be realized as depicted by the
leading statesmen in Congress previous to the execution of these
military movements (see synopsis of debates from _Congressional
Globe_, pp. 21, 22 of memorial).

The effect of this campaign upon the country and the anxiety to find
out and reward the author are evidenced by the resolution of Mr.
Roscoe Conkling, in the House of Representatives 24th of February,
1862 (see debates on the origin of the campaign, pp. 39-63 of
memorial). But it was deemed prudent to make no public claim as to
authorship while the war lasted (see Colonel Scott's view, p. 32 of
memorial).

The wisdom of the plan was proven, not only by the absolute advantages
which resulted, giving the mastery of the conflict to the National
arms and evermore assuring their success even against the powers of
all Europe should they have combined, but it was likewise proven by
the failures to open the Mississippi or win any decided success on the
plan first devised by the Government.

It is further conclusively shown that no plan, order, letter,
telegram, or suggestion of the Tennessee River as the line of invasion
has ever been produced, except in the paper submitted by Miss Carroll
on the 30th of November, 1861, and her subsequent letters to the
Government as the campaign progressed.

It is further shown to this Committee that the able and patriotic
publications of memor