ue, to wit, that they remain inviolated so long as the
law of charity is not by men violated about the same." Much less, then,
can the laws of princes about things spiritual or ecclesiastical bind
absolutely, and out of the case of violating the law of charity.

2. If we be not bound to receive and acknowledge the laws of princes as
good and equitable, except only in so far as they are warranted by the law
of God and nature, then we are not bound in conscience to obey them,
except only conditionally, in case the violating of them include the
violating of the law of God and nature; but the former is true, therefore
the latter. It is God's peculiar sovereignty, that his will is a rule
ruling, but not ruled, and that therefore a thing is good because God will
have it to be good. Man's will is only such a rule as is ruled by higher
rules, and it must be known to be _norma recta_ before it can be to us
_norma recti_.

3. If we be bound to try and examine, by the judgment of discretion
(following the rules of the word), whether the things which princes
command be right, and such as ought to be done; and if we find them not to
be such, to neglect them, then their laws cannot bind absolutely and by
themselves, (else what need were there of such trial and examination?) but
only conditionally, and in case they cannot be neglected without violating
some other law, which is of a superior bond. But the former we have proved
by strong reasons, therefore the latter standeth sure.

4. If neither princes may command, nor we do anything which is not lawful
and expedient, and according to the other rules of the word, then the laws
of princes bind not absolutely, but only in case the neglecting of them
cannot stand with the law of charity and the rules of the word; but the
former hath been evinced and made good, therefore the latter necessarily
followeth.

5. If the laws of princes could bind absolutely and simply, so that in no
case, without offending God and wounding our conscience, we could neglect
them, this bond should arise either from their own authority, or from the
matter and thing itself which is commanded, but from neither of these it
can arise, therefore from nothing. It cannot arise from any authority
which they have, for if, by their authority, we mean their princely
pre-eminence and dignity, they are princes when they command things
unlawful as well as when they command things lawful, and so if, because of
their pre-emine