e or
_scrutin de liste_ is that it gives all the representation to the
majority, and excludes the minority; its merit is that it prevents the
formation of a number of minorities. How this evil will be doubled if it
is entirely removed by allowing both majority and minority their just
share of representation we leave the Professor to explain. The statement
that the scheme would play into the hands of those who are best able to
organize is absolutely without foundation. On the contrary, the
organization is automatic. It would certainly encourage the formation of
organizations to influence the policies of the parties, since every
organization would be able to exert its proportionate influence, but
that is an advantage, not an evil. We will leave the statement about
party government alone, and now take the "practical illustration." The
Professor here assumes three distinct parties, but it is quite evident
there are only two. It is not usual for Liberal Unionists and
Conservatives to fight one another at elections in Great Britain at
present. In the same way, if a section of Liberals and a section of
Conservatives unite to oppose a Government, they will work together and
not try to exclude one another. Moreover, they will have a common
policy, so that it matters little who are elected so long as they are
the best men to carry out the policy. Is it likely the Conservatives
would join the Liberals, if the latter were trying to get all the
seats? Thus all the Professor's assumptions are incorrect. But even if
they were correct the conclusion is still wrong. The Liberal section
could not get all the seats if they tried. Imagine a ten-seat
electorate, in which the combined party is entitled to nine members. The
electors would not be required to vote for more than five candidates,
whereas the Professor has assumed that they would be forced to vote for
nine. He has forgotten that the Block Vote becomes the Limited Vote
under the conditions named, and that the Limited Vote allows the
minority a share of representation. Besides, in any case, these
conditions would never arise in a country in a healthy state of
political activity, because then parties would tend more nearly to
equalize each other in strength.

It has also been objected that a Ministerialist candidate, say, might
stand as an Oppositionist, if the votes of the Opposition candidates
were more split up and it was likely to require less votes for election
in that party. T