13.
D, E, and F would therefore be elected. Thus we see that A, B, and C,
the favourites of sections within the party, are elected, and D, E, and
F, the candidates most in general favour--those who represent a
compromise among the sections--are rejected.
In practice, then, the Hare system discourages compromise among parties,
and among sections of parties; and therefore tends to obliterate party
lines. This has already happened in Tasmania, where all experience goes
to show that the Hare system is equivalent to compulsory plumping. In
every election the result would have been exactly the same if each
elector voted for one candidate only. The theory that it does not matter
how many candidates stand for each party, since votes will be
transferred within the party, has been completely disproved. Votes are
actually transferred almost indiscriminately. The candidates have not
been slow to grasp this fact, and at the last election handbills were
distributed giving "explicit reasons why the electors should give their
No. 1 to Mr. So-and-so, and their No. 2 to any other person they
chose."[7] Three out of every four first preferences are found to be
effective, but only one out of every five second preferences, and one
out of fifty third preferences. The first preferences, therefore, decide
the election.
The actual result is that, in the long run, the Hare system is
practically the same as the single untransferable vote. The whole of the
elaborate machinery for recording preferences and transferring votes
might just as well be entirely dispensed with. The "automatic
organization" which it was to provide exists only in the calculations of
mathematicians.
+A Number of Votes are Wasted.+--It is claimed for the Hare system that
every vote cast is effective, because it counts for some one candidate.
But unless every elector places all the candidates in order of
preference some votes are wasted because the preferences become
exhausted.
When a paper to be transferred has no further available preferences
expressed it is lost. In order to reduce this waste, a vote is held to
be informal in the six-seat electorate at Hobart unless at least three
preferences are given. Notwithstanding this, the number of such votes
wasted was 7 per cent, at the first election and 10 per cent, at the
second.
The effect of this waste is that some of the candidates are elected
with less than the quota. At the last Hobart election only three out o
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