ons of
the Hare system, we may proceed to consider some details which are
common to all of them. A difference of opinion exists, however, as
regards the quota. Sir John Lubbock and Professor Nanson advocate the
Droop quota, which we have shown to be a mathematical error; Miss Spence
and Mr. Clark use the correct quota.

+The Wrong Candidates are Liable to be Elected.+--The Hare system may be
criticised from two points of view; first, as applied to the conditions
prevailing when it is introduced, and, secondly, as regards the new
conditions it would bring about. Its advocates confine themselves to the
first point of view, and invariably use illustrations based on the
existence of parties.

We readily grant that if the electors vote on party lines, and transfer
their votes within the party as assumed, the Hare system would give
proportional representation to the parties; but even then it would
sacrifice the interests of individual candidates, for it affords no
guarantee that the right candidates will be elected. The constant
tendency is that favourites of factions within the party will be
preferred to general favourites. This at the same time destroys party
cohesion, and tends to split up parties. Nor can this result be wondered
at, since the very foundation of the system is the separate
representation of a number of sections.

One reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is that the
electors will not record their honest preferences if the one vote only
is effective. They will give their vote to the candidate who is thought
to need it most, and the best men will go to the wall because they are
thought to be safe. Mr. R.M. Johnston, Government Statistician of
Tasmania, confirms this view when he declares--"The aggregate of all
counts, whether effective or not, would seem to be the truer index of
the general favour in which each candidate stands, because the numbers
polled at the first count may be greatly disturbed by the action of
those who are interested in the success of two or more favourites who
may be pretty well assured of success, but whose order of preference
might by some be altered if sudden rumour suggested fears for any one of
the favoured group. This accidental action would tend to conceal the
true exact measure of favour in the first count." If this statement
means anything it is that the three preferences which are required to be
expressed should have been all counted as effective votes a