ct. I cannot but admit
that if a great war with Germany arose, whatever might be the issue,
it might reproduce those great contests which took place in 1814, and
which led to such unsatisfactory results. The Emperor of the French is
a Sovereign singularly wise and sagacious, and I will say valuing,
as he has proved that he values, the peace of Europe, I am not in a
position to find fault, nor can Her Majesty's Government find any
fault with the decision to which the Emperor has come. But the Emperor
of the French having thus declared his policy, and the Emperor of
Russia having constantly refused to join with us in affording
material support to Denmark, our position, of course, must be greatly
influenced by those decisions. In the first place, is it the duty of
this country--if we are to undertake the preservation of the balance
of power in Europe as it was recognized in 1852--is it a duty
incumbent on us alone? The French Government sees very clearly the
dangers to which France might be exposed by interfering, but it says
at the same time that it would be an easy operation for England;
that England, with her naval power, might add most materially to the
strength of Denmark and assist in bringing the war to a conclusion.
My Lords, I must say there are many considerations which induce me to
arrive at a different conclusion. I cannot but think, in the first
place, that we should suffer perhaps considerably if our commercial
marine was exposed to depredations such as might take place in the
event of our being at war with Germany. That is one consideration
which ought not to be overlooked. But there are other considerations
of still greater moment. One is--Would our interference bring this
war to a conclusion? Without giving military aid could you recover
Schleswig and Holstein, and even Jutland from the Austrian and
Prussian forces? Well, my Lords, we have for a long time in our
conduct of foreign affairs shown great forbearance and patience. I
think we were right in being forbearing, and think we were justified
in being patient. But if our honour or our interests or the great
interests of Europe should call upon us to interfere, I think such
interference ought to be clearly effectual, as nothing would more tend
to diminish the influence of this country than a course of action
which would show that while we were predominant at sea, and that no
Austrian or Prussian ships of war could venture to leave port, yet at
the same t
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