r externally by sensation; whatever we feel
internally by reflection; all these are nothing but modifications of
that one, simple, and necessarily existent being, and are not possest
of any separate or distinct existence. Every passion of the soul; every
configuration of matter, however different and various, inhere in
the same substance, and preserve in themselves their characters of
distinction, without communicating them to that subject, in which
they inhere. The same substratum, if I may so speak, supports the most
different modifications, without any difference in itself; and varies
them, without any variation. Neither time, nor place, nor all the
diversity of nature are able to produce any composition or change in its
perfect simplicity and identity.

I believe this brief exposition of the principles of that famous atheist
will be sufficient for the present purpose, and that without entering
farther into these gloomy and obscure regions, I shall be able to
shew, that this hideous hypothesis is almost the same with that of the
immateriality of the soul, which has become so popular. To make this
evident, let us [Part II, Sect. 6.] remember, that as every idea is
derived from a preceding perception, it is impossible our idea of
a perception, and that of an object or external existence can ever
represent what are specifically different from each other. Whatever
difference we may suppose betwixt them, it is still incomprehensible to
us; and we are obliged either to conceive an external object merely as
a relation without a relative, or to make it the very same with a
perception or impression.

The consequence I shall draw from this may, at first sight, appear a
mere sophism; but upon the least examination will be found solid and
satisfactory. I say then, that since we may suppose, but never can
conceive a specific deference betwixt an object and impression;
any conclusion we form concerning the connexion and repugnance of
impressions, will not be known certainly to be applicable to objects;
but that on the other hand, whatever conclusions of this kind we form
concerning objects, will most certainly be applicable to impressions.
The reason is not difficult. As an object is supposed to be different
from an impression, we cannot be sure, that the circumstance, upon
which we found our reasoning, is common to both, supposing we form the
reasoning upon the impression. It is still possible, that the object may
differ from i