place in the hands of the French five others of the first importance.
The road from France to Italy was to be at all times open to the French
armies; and indeed the King, by surrender of the places mentioned, had
lost the power of interrupting their progress. He was to break off every
species of alliance and connection with the combined powers at war with
France, and become bound not to entertain at his court, or in his
service, any French emigrants whatsoever, or any of their connections;
nor was an exception even made in favor of his own two daughters. In
short, the surrender was absolute. Victor Amadeus exhibited the utmost
reluctance to subscribe this treaty, and did not long survive it. His
son succeeded in name to the kingdom of Piedmont; but the fortresses and
passes which had rendered him a prince of some importance were,
excepting Turin and one or two of minor consequence, all surrendered
into the hands of the French.

Viewing this treaty with Sardinia as the close of the Piedmontese
campaign, we pause to consider the character which Bonaparte displayed
at that period. The talents as a general which he had exhibited were of
the very first order. There was no disconnection in his objects, they
were all attained by the very means he proposed, and the success was
improved to the utmost. A different conduct usually characterizes those
who stumble unexpectedly on victory, either by good-fortune or by the
valor of their troops. When the favorable opportunity occurs to such
leaders, they are nearly as much embarrassed by it as by a defeat. But
Bonaparte, who had foreseen the result of each operation by his
sagacity, stood also prepared to make the most of the advantages which
might be derived from it.

His style in addressing the Convention was, at this period, more modest
and simple, and therefore more impressive, than the figurative and
bombastic style which he afterward used in his bulletins. His
self-opinion, perhaps, was not risen so high as to permit him to use the
sesquipedalian words and violent metaphors, to which he afterward seems
to have given a preference. We may remark also, that the young victor
was honorably anxious to secure for such officers as distinguished
themselves the preferment which their services entitled them to. He
urges the promotion of his brethren-in-arms in almost every one of his
despatches--a conduct not only just and generous, but also highly
politic. Were his recommendations succ