f that there had been collusion in the case, that his wife and he
were really on good terms, and that he was anxious to regain her. The
Proctor took his word, and without going into the case further, when
the six months were up, refused to confirm the decree. And then her
friends said: "You had better give up. England has decided that you
cannot be free." And her lawyers said: "Even with fresh evidence it
would be foolish to re-open the fight. The action of the Queen's
Proctor is so insurmountable." But the woman said to herself: "Though
England has decided that I must be a slave, nevertheless I will be
free." Meantime Lieutenant Lynch-Blosse, after endeavoring to blacken
his wife's character in his regiment, and getting soundly thrashed for
his pains, eloped with a light-headed Scotch peeress whose husband,
Lord Torphichen, promptly obtained a divorce, with the custody of his
children, and the elopers fled the kingdom, leaving a small army of
swindled tradesmen who are still exceedingly anxious to discover their
whereabouts. When last heard of, the ex-uniform was living in Chicago
under an _alias_, and he will probably remain one of the many English
ornaments of this country, for the same English law that permits a man
to castigate his wife in moderation is excessively severe if he
swindles tradesmen.
Mrs. Lynch-Blosse obtained her Dakotan divorce on the ground of
adultery, the evidence being the record of the Scotch suit of Lord
Torphichen against Lady Torphichen, otherwise styled the Right Hon.
Ellen Frances Gordon, and apart from the wrongs, the beauty, and the
pioneer courage of Mrs. Lynch-Blosse, picturesque as they made it, her
case possesses profound interest to the legal mind. It adds to the
weight of such cases as except to the old rule of domicile (Ditson
_v._ Ditson, 4 R. I., 87; Harding _v._ Alden, 9 Mo. 140; Hollister
_v._ Hollister, 6 Pa. St., 449; Derby _v._ Derby, 14 Ill. App., 645)
by showing that where a husband is guilty of such conduct as would
entitle even to a limited divorce, the wife is at liberty to establish
a separate jurisdictional domicile. Moreover, Mrs. Lynch-Blosse might
have obtained a divorce on grounds less strong than she did, for a
divorce good at the place of domicile will be sustained in England,
though the same grounds would have been insufficient to obtain it
there. (Harvey _v._ Farnie, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 43; Turner _v._
Thompson, L. R., 13 P. D. 37.) Of this law, probably, comi
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