ss the government at every opportunity. It complained that the
promises in the Declaration of October 22d were not carried out; that
the grievances of the taxpayers had not been remedied; moreover, like
the National Assembly in 1789, it was much agitated at the gradual
concentration of troops around Paris. Though Orleans and Conde visited
the Parliament in December and promised that the Declaration of October
22d should be loyally executed, the attacks on the government, and
especially on Mazarin, increased in violence.

Countless pamphlets styled _mazarinades_ were published containing abuse
of the Cardinal. "It was the fashion to hate Mazarin," is the
declaration of a court lady, and the hatred was shared by the nobles and
the workmen of Paris. He gained no thanks for the conclusion of the
Peace of Westphalia, but was attacked for not bringing the war with
Spain to a close. These attacks on the Cardinal were intensified by the
support which they gained from De Retz. In the existing complications
lay his chance of securing at least notoriety. Utterly unprincipled, and
absolutely devoid of any patriotic feelings, De Retz hoped during the
coming troubles to become the practical ruler of Paris. For five years
Paris read little else but mazarinades, which, with very rare
exceptions, were utterly devoid of literary merit. These attacks on his
authority and position implied, in Mazarin's opinion, the growth of
revolutionary views, and he warned the Queen-mother that the situation
in France resembled that in England at the opening of the civil war. He
thought that his own position was like Strafford's, and he was prepared
to act vigorously. The encroachments on the royal power increased, and
the Cardinal advocated a fresh retirement from Paris. On January 5,
1649, the court, under circumstances of haste and secrecy, moved
suddenly to St. Germain, and the Parisians the following morning "saw
war, siege, and famine at their gates."

The civil war had begun, and continued from January 6 to April 1, 1649.
Mazarin hoped, by means of the troops, to cut Paris off from all
supplies and to starve it into surrender. But the army of fifteen
thousand was not large enough for carrying out so elaborate a scheme,
and Mazarin had to be content with occupying the principal posts outside
the city. Under Conde the military operations were efficiently
performed, and the Parisians, with their hastily raised army, could do
little but defend thems