ngenuity to
know how a court, in one of the free States, always leaning, of
course, against slavery, would reason out that proposition, whether
the remedy could be applied. Suppose an action of trover is brought.
The inquiry would be, what is the remedy? We are told this is the
remedy for which you are to apply to the law. A remedy is nothing in
the world but a redress for wrong. Before you can apply the remedy,
therefore, you must ascertain whether a wrong has been committed for
which the remedy is adequate. Well, it comes from one side: the wrong
was in taking the negro from the possession of the owner, against the
local law of the Territory. The answer would be, "that may be true as
far as the local law of the Territory is concerned; but here the
Constitution adopts the common law as part of its text, and points the
judges to the common law, and it applies the remedy." Now, the remedy
is redress of the wrong, and we are bound to see that the wrong is one
to which the remedy is applicable. The remedy is to recover property
in the possession of one who is not entitled to it, and the common
law, which applies that remedy to that wrong, says there is no wrong
inflicted by taking the negro from the possession of his owner. It
comes to that. It is suggested to me by the honorable Senator from
Vermont [Mr. COLLAMER], that the common law, as a remedy, is one
applicable to a common-law wrong. I do not say that the reasoning is
just; I do not say that it is juridical; but I say, in our experience,
we should be willingly blind if we take that for a security which will
only be a snare.

Mr. PUGH:--Mr. President, it is very well known to the Senate that I
prefer the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky, as a matter of
individual choice, to the proposition which is proposed by the Peace
Conference. Nevertheless, that Conference having been authorized, if
not by Congress, at all events, so far as my State is concerned, by
the act of her Legislature; and an overwhelming majority of the
commissioners having agreed to this proposition as it stands, I shall
hesitate very much in departing from it, whatever might be my
individual opinion; but certainly if I thought the two Senators from
Virginia had given it a correct interpretation, I should not agree to
it. Now, as to this clause, it, in my judgment, had better have been
omitted:

"The same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the
Federal courts, according to th