recisely what I have
stated. I cannot see, for my life, while they were framing a
constitutional provision, why they did not place this matter beyond
any sort of doubt. If they intended to recognize slavery, they could
have said so in one word. If they intended not to recognize it, they
could have said it in another word. If they intended to mystify and
leave in doubt, then they have been very successful in accomplishing
their purpose.

Mr. CRITTENDEN:--"In all the present territory south of that line, the
_status_ of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now
exists;" not as they now exist; not in respect to those that are there
now; but part of the same sort of slavery which now exists, shall
continue to exist unchanged until the Territory becomes a State; and
in the mean time persons shall be admitted to go into that Territory
and carry their slaves with them. Now, I submit it to my honorable
friend if it is not entirely improbable that any such construction as
he suggests can prevail before any court that seeks to attain the real
intention of the parties who made this proposition? It is such slavery
as now exists. Persons held to that service--you may carry as many
there as you please. Put them both together, and they would read so;
and they being in the same instrument, can there be a doubt that ought
to alarm us here, that the construction will be given to it which I
place upon it, that it was intended not to be confined merely to
persons now there and held to servitude, but as well to those who
might be carried there hereafter? This is all I will say in reference
to that; and I submit it to the candor and the judgment of my
honorable friend from North Carolina, in which I have entire
confidence, whatever result he may come to, that if we put the two
propositions together, all doubt would seem to be removed.

Now, sir, my friend from Virginia will argue this question as if the
question of slavery was to be decided according to the course of the
common law, and then refers us to the express declarations and
decisions as though the common law decided that slavery could not
exist. What sort of construction would that make of this provision?
Here they have provided that the law establishing slavery shall exist,
that the property of the master in him shall be recognized as it is
there established by law; and then the gentleman supposes that to be
exactly contradictory, to refer to the common law as furni