delivered ultimately upon the line
Namur-Charleroi-Mons. That is, the situation was roughly that of the
accompanying diagram: by the bottle neck at D the whole mass of troops
must pass--or most of them--which are later to strike on the front AB.
To reach that front was available to the invader the vast network of
Belgian railways RRR crammed with rolling stock, and provided such
opportunities for rapid advance as no other district in Europe could
show. But all this system converged upon the main line which ran
through the ring of forts round Liege, L, and so passed through
Aix-la-Chapelle, A, and to Germany.

[Illustration: Sketch 33.]

The German Government, therefore, could not be secure of its intention
to pass great bodies through the Belgian Plain until Liege was
grasped, and it was determined to grasp Liege long before the
mobilization of the German forces was completed. For this purpose only
a comparatively small force, rapidly gathered, was available. It was
placed under the command of General von Emmerich, and its first bodies
exchanged shots with the Belgian outposts early in the afternoon of
Tuesday, August 4, 1914.

The hour and date should always be remembered for the solemnity which
attaches to the beginning of any great thing; and the full observer of
European affairs, who understands what part religion or superstition
plays in the story of Europe, will note this enormously significant
detail. The first Germans to cross the violated frontier accomplished
that act upon the same day and at the same hour as that in which
their forerunners had crossed the French frontier forty-four years
before.

The afternoon wore on to night, with no more than a conflict between
outposts. Just before midnight the cannonade was first heard. It also
was the moment in which the ultimatum delivered to Germany by this
country, by a coincidence, expired.[2]

This night attack with guns was only delivered against one sector of
the Liege forts, and only with field-pieces.

As to the first of these points, it will be found repeated throughout
the whole of the campaign wherever German forces attack a ring of
permanent works. For the German theory in this matter (which
experience has now amply supported) is that since modern permanent
works _of known and restricted position_ go under to a modern siege
train if the fire of the latter be fully concentrated and the largest
pieces available, everything should be sacrificed to the