the retreat, and within forty-eight
of the fall of Namur, to be an operation of a difficulty so extreme as
to imperil the whole campaign, and in this operation it was the
British force upon the outer left edge of the line--the unsupported
extremity round which the enemy made every effort to get--which was
bound to receive the severest treatment. This peculiar burden laid
upon the Expeditionary Force from this country was, of course, gravely
increased by the delay in beginning its retreat, which we have seen to
be due to the delay in the communication to it by the French of the
news of the fall of Namur. On account of this delay not only was the
extreme of the line which the British held immediately threatened with
outflanking, but it still lay somewhat forward of the rest of the
force. It was in danger of being turned round its exposed edge C, not
only because it lay on the extreme of the line, but also because,
instead of occupying its normal position, AB, which it would have
occupied had the retreat begun with all the rest, it actually occupied
the position CD, which made it far more likely to be surrounded than
if it had been a day's march farther back, as it would have been if
the French Staff work had suffered no delays.

[Illustration: Sketch 54.]

There lay in the gap formed by this untoward tardiness in the British
retirement, at the point M, the fortress of Maubeuge. It was
garrisoned by French reserves, or Territorial troops, not of the same
quality as the active army, and its defensive power was, even if the
old ring of fortress theory had proved sound, of very doubtful order.

The French 5th Army being no longer present to support the British
right, but having fallen back behind the alignment of that right,
General Sir John French had no support for what should have been his
secure flank save this fortress of Maubeuge, and it will be evident
from the above diagram that the enemy, should he succeed in
outflanking the British line, would compel it to fall back within the
ring of forts surrounding Maubeuge. To avoid destruction it would have
no alternative but to do that. For, counting the forces in front of it
and the forces trying to get round its back, it was fighting odds of
two to one.

Maubeuge was a stronghold that had played a great part in the
revolutionary war. Its resistance in the month of October 1793 had
made possible the French victory of Wattigines, just outside its
walls, and had, perhaps,