been maintained in the preceding
twenty-four hours.

But men have limits to their physical powers, which limits commonly
appear sharply, not gradually, at the end of a great movement. The 1st
Corps had been marching and fighting a day and a night, and that after
a preceding whole day of retirement from before Mons. It was unable to
execute a further effort. Further, the general in command of the 2nd
Corps reported that the German pressure had advanced too far to permit
of breaking contact in the face of such an attack.

It would have been of the utmost use if at this moment a large body of
French cavalry--no less than three divisions--under General Sordet,
could have intervened upon that critical moment, the morning of
Wednesday, the 26th, to have covered the retirement of the 1st Corps.
They were in the neighbourhood; the British commander had seen their
commander in the course of the 25th, and had represented his need.
Through some error or misfortune in the previous movement of this
corps--such that its horses were incapable of further action through
fatigue--it failed to appear upon the field in this all-important
juncture, and General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was left facing
overwhelming odds, which in artillery--the arm that was doing all the
heavy work of that morning--were not less than four to one.

The fact that the retirement was at last made possible was due more
than anything else to the handling of the British guns upon this day,
and to the devotion with which the batteries sacrificed themselves to
the covering of that movement; while the cavalry, as in the preceding
two days, co-operated in forming a screen for the retreat.

It was about half-past three in the afternoon when the general in
command of this exposed left flank judged it possible to break
contact, and to give the order for falling back. The experiment--for
it seems to have been no more secure than such a word suggests--was
perilous in the extreme. It was not known whether the consequences of
this fierce artillery duel against an enemy of four-fold superiority
had been sufficient to forbid that enemy to make good the pursuit.
Luckily, as the operation developed, it was apparent that the check
inflicted upon such enormous odds by the British guns was sufficient
for its purpose. The enemy had received losses that forbade him to
move with the rapidity necessary to him if he was to decide the
matter. He failed to press the retiring 2nd British