last result, the
destruction of the whole Allied force in the West.

The thing may be represented on a sketch map in this form.

Of von Kluck's five corps, 1 is operating against the junction of the
English and French lines beyond Binche, 2, 3, and 4 are massing
against the rather more than one and a half of Sir John French at AA,
and 5, after the capture of Tournai, is going to take a big sweep
round in the direction of the arrow towards Cambrai, and so to turn
the whole line. Meanwhile, the cavalry, still farther west, acting
independently, is to sweep the country right out to Arras and beyond.

[Illustration: Sketch 46.]

The particular titles of corps are of no great value in following the
leading main lines of a military movement; but it may be worth
remembering that this "number 5," to which von Kluck had allotted the
turning movement, was the _Second_ German Corps. With its cavalry it
numbered alone (and apart from all the other forces of von Kluck which
were engaging the British line directly) quite three-quarters as many
men as all that British line for the moment mustered.

It was not possible, from local circumstances which the full history
of the war, when it is written, will explain, for the British
contingent to fall back in the remaining hours of daylight upon that
Sunday.

Belated by at the most twelve hours, as the news of the French
retirement had been, the British retirement followed it fully twenty
hours after. It was not until daylight of Monday, the 24th, that all
the organizations for this retirement were completed, the plans drawn
up, and the first retrograde movements made.

To permit a retirement before such a great superiority of the enemy to
be made without disaster, it was necessary to counter-attack not only
at this inception of the movement, but throughout all the terrible
strain of the ensuing eight days.

Here it may be necessary to explain why, in any retirement, continual
counter-attacks on the pursuing enemy are necessary.

It is obvious that, under equal conditions, the pursuing enemy can
advance as fast as can your own troops which are retreating before
him. If, therefore, a retreat, once contact has been established,
consisted in merely walking away from the enemy, that enemy would be
able to maintain a ceaseless activity against one portion of your
united force--its rear--which activity would be exercised against
bodies on the march, and incapable of defence. To take b