e feuds then
prevailing amongst the Suddozye princes, (Shah Soojah and his brothers,)
the scheme would have been executed; in which case, falling in with our
own great Mahratta struggle under Lord Wellesley, such an inroad would
have given a chance, worth valuing, that the sceptre might have passed
from England--England at that time having neither steamers for the
Indus, nor improved artillery against Affghan jezails, besides having
her hands full of work. Between 1801 and 1838, it is true that things
had altered; for the better, we admit; but also for the worse. Much
stronger were we; but, on the other hand, much nearer were the Affghans.
Delhi and Agra, with their vast adjacencies, had become ours. Cutch was
ours, our outposts were pushed to the Sutlege; and beyond the Sutlege we
had stretched a network of political relations. We therefore were
vulnerable in a more exquisite sense. And on the other hand, as
respected the power of the Affghans to wound, _that_ had not essentially
declined. The Affghan power, it must be remembered, had never exposed a
showy front of regal pomp, such as oftentimes deceives both friend and
foe, masking a system of forces hollow and curious when probed by
foreign war, but had combined the popular energy arising from a rough
republican simplicity, and something even of republican freedom, with
the artificial energy for war of a despotism lodged in a few hands. Of
all oriental races, the Affghans had best resisted the effeminacy of
oriental usages, and in some respects we may say--of Mahometan
institutions. Their strength lay in their manly character; their
weakness in their inveterate disunion. But this, though quite incapable
of permanent remedy under Mahometan ideas, could be suspended under the
compression of a common warlike interest; and _that_ had been splendidly
put on record by the grandfather of Shah Soojah. It was not to be
denied--that in the event of a martial prince arising, favourably
situated for gaining a momentary hold over the disunited tribes, he
might effectually combine them for all the purposes of an aggressive
war, by pointing their desires to the plunder of India. The boundless
extent of India, the fabulous but really vast magnificence of her
wealth, and the martial propensities of the Affghans, were always moving
upon lines tending to one centre. Sometimes these motives were
stationary, sometimes moving in opposite directions; but if ever a
popular soldier should pre