ss them to a convergence, there could be no
doubt that a potent Affghan army would soon be thrown beyond the
Punjaub. An Affghan armament requires little baggage; and if it be asked
how the Affghans were to find supplies for a numerous army which they
never could subsist at home, the answer is--for that very reason,
because they would _not_ be at home. The Roman principle of making war
support war would be easily applied to the rich tracts of central India,
which an Affghan leader would endeavour to make the theatre of his
aggression. They could move faster than we could. Semi-barbarism
furnishes strength in that respect; and it would be vain to think of
acting politically upon Affghanistan, when all her martial children were
in the act of projecting themselves upon stages of action which would
soon furnish their own recompense to strength of character and to
persevering courage. In fact, the slightest review of Indian history,
ever since the first introduction of Mahometanism, justifies Lord
Auckland's general purpose of interweaving Affghanistan with the
political system of India. This was no purpose of itinerant Quixotism--
seeking enemies where none offered of themselves. Affghans were _always_
enemies; they formed the _castra stativa_ of hostility to India. For
eight hundred years, ever since the earliest invader under the Prophet's
banner, (Mahommed of Ghuznee,) the Affghans had been the scourges of
India; for centuries establishing dynasties of their own race; leaving
behind them populous nations of their own blood; founding the most
warlike tribes in Hindostan; and, not content with this representative
influence in the persons of their descendants, continually renewing
their inroads from the parent hives in Affghanistan. Could such a
people, brought by our own advance into so dangerous a neighbourhood,
have been much longer neglected?

With any safety to ourselves, certainly not. At least the outline of
Lord Auckland's policy must be approved as wise and seasonable. All the
great internal enemies of Indian peace had been reduced within English
control by former governments; others had dealt, so far as circumstances
required, with the most petulant of our outlying neighbours, Nepaul and
Burmah; and sooner or later, if mischief were to be _prevented_, as well
as healed, it would be necessary to bring Affghanistan within the
general system of cautionary ties. We wanted nothing with the
independence of that country,