selection and
that execution? We contend that, besides those _directly_ responsible
parties, others were so to a criminal extent; every artillery officer
was so; and therefore, unless some further explanations are made,
Lieutenant Eyre is so. But surely Lieutenant Eyre has exposed the vices
of these cantonments. True, he has so; _some_ of the vices, but not all,
but not the worst. The ground, he tells us, was bad; the line of
fortifications too extensive; the interior overlooked in parts; and
(with a view to the accommodation of the envoy) the defences absolutely
interrupted in their regular series. True; and therefore, night and day,
it became the duty of every artillery officer to cry out, _Delenda est
Carthago_. But all this is not the worst. Even a child knows that, under
the circumstances of the case, and the known reversionary uses of such a
retreat in the event of its being wanted at all, (except as a barrack,)
it was of the last importance to destroy all the strong places, nay,
even all the cover, strong or not strong, which could shelter an enemy.
This was not attempted, or thought of, until it became too late. Next,
it was of even more clamorous importance to have the corn magazine
_within_ the line of defences: no effort was made in that direction.
Now, had these been the only defects of the cantonments, they were
enough to argue a constructive treason in those who neglected to
denounce then. We know how they operated. These three ruins issued from
these most culpable negligences:--1st, Starvation fell in one day upon
the British host; and _that_ it was which placed them at the mercy of
the enemy. 2dly, The troops were inadequate to the extent of the
defences; so that, together with starvation, loss of sleep fell upon the
fighting men. 3dly, As another effect from that cause, a perpetual
Penelope's web was to be maintained; for as often as detachments went
out from cantonments against the many neighbouring forts, before they
could possibly have time to destroy these nests of hornets, back they
were summoned to the defence of their own _lares_; often in broad
daylight, by combined assaults of the enemy on their own ramparts, but
always by the approach of night. So that all momentary advantages became
idle and useless; none could be followed up, none could be maintained.
Lucan says of Caesar, when besieged in the fortified palace of the
Ptolemies at Alexandria, that often, whilst thrown on his most difficult
de