eontines. This
unexpected humiliation at length forced Nikias to proceed to Syracuse,
and he devised a stratagem by which he was able to approach that city
and pitch his camp before it unmolested.

He despatched to Syracuse a citizen of Katana, who informed the
Syracusans that if they desired to seize the camp and arms of the
Athenians, they would only have to appoint a day and to march in force
to Katana. Many of the Athenians, he said, spent all their time within
the walls of Katana, and it would be easy for the Syracusan party
there to close the gates, assail the Athenians within, and set fire to
their ships. A numerous body of Kataneans, he added, were eager to
co-operate in the plan now proposed.

This was by far the ablest piece of strategy accomplished by Nikias
during all the time that he remained in Sicily. The Syracusans were
induced to march out their entire force, leaving their city with
scarcely any defenders. Meanwhile, Nikias sailed round from Katana,
took possession of the harbour, and encamped his forces on the
mainland in a position where he could not be attacked by the enemy's
cavalry. When the Syracusan army returned from Katana, he marched out
the Athenians and defeated them, but with little loss on their side,
as their cavalry covered their retreat. Nikias now broke down the
bridges over the river Anapus, which gave occasion to Hermokrates to
say, when he was making a speech to encourage the Syracusans, that it
was a ridiculous thing for Nikias to try to avoid fighting, as though
it were not for the express purpose of fighting that he had been sent
thither. But in spite of all that Hermokrates could say, the
Syracusans were very much cast down and disheartened. Instead of the
fifteen generals who usually commanded their troops they chose three,
upon whom they conferred absolute powers, and swore a solemn oath that
they would leave them unfettered in the exercise of those powers.

The Athenians were very anxious to occupy the temple of Olympian Zeus,
which was near their camp, and full of offerings of gold and silver.
Nikias, however, purposely delayed the attack until a force was sent
from Syracuse to defend the temple. He thought that if the soldiers
did succeed in plundering it, the state would be none the better for
it, and he himself would have to bear all the blame of sacrilege.

Nikias made no use of his boasted victory, and after a short time drew
off his forces to Naxos, where he passed