y. They therefore determined to renew the
conflict with better success.

Nikias, on his part, was unwilling to fight a second time, thinking it
was folly to fight with a diminished and disheartened force when he
knew that Demosthenes was hurrying to his aid with a large and
unbroken armament. However, Menander and Euthydemus, the newly-elected
generals, were eager to distinguish themselves by performing some
brilliant action before the arrival of Demosthenes, and to eclipse the
fame of Nikias himself. The pretext they used was the glory of Athens,
which they said would be dishonoured for ever if they should now
appear afraid to accept the Syracusans' offer of battle. The battle
was fought: and the Athenian left wing, we are told by Thucydides, was
utterly defeated by the skilful tactics of the Corinthian steersman
Aristion. Many Athenians perished, and Nikias was greatly
disheartened, for he had now proved unfortunate both when sole
commander and when acting with colleagues.

XXI. Matters were in this posture when Demosthenes was descried in the
offing, approaching with a splendid armament which struck terror into
the hearts of the enemy. His fleet consisted of seventy-three ships,
on board of which were five thousand heavy-armed troops, and three
thousand javelin men, archers, and slingers. The glittering arms of
the troops, the flaunting banners of the ships of war, and the music
of the flutes to which the rowers kept time with their oars, made a
gallant display, which delighted the Athenians as much as it depressed
the Syracusans. These latter, indeed, were struck with dismay, and
thought that their last victory had been won in vain, and that they
were labouring to no purpose against a foe whose ranks were
continually reinforced.

Nikias was not long allowed to feast his eyes on this welcome
spectacle undisturbed. Demosthenes, as soon as he landed, insisted on
the necessity of instantly attacking Syracuse, and putting an end to
the siege, either by capturing the place, or by returning at once to
Athens in case of failure. Against this Nikias, who was alarmed at the
idea of such vigorous action, urged that it would be unwise to run
such a risk. Delay, he argued, favoured the besiegers more than the
besieged, as their resources must soon fail, in which case their
allies would desert them and they would again be brought to the
necessity of capitulating. Nikias adopted this view because of what he
heard from his secr