aving entertained the same views; but the case is so
well put by Mr. Field, in his address before the American Geographical
Society, as, in my judgment, to relieve every apprehension upon this
point.

The relative geographical position of the two countries cannot be
changed. It so happens, that the two points on the opposite sides of
the Atlantic nearest to each other, and which are therefore the natural
termini of an ocean telegraph, are both in British territory. Of
course, the Government which holds both ends can control the use of the
telegraph, or stop it altogether. It has the power, and the only check
upon the abuse of that power must be by a treaty, made beforehand. Shall
we refuse to aid in constructing the line, for fear that England, in
the exasperation of a war, would disregard any treaty stipulations in
reference to its use? Then we throw away our only security. For, suppose
a war to break out to-morrow, the first step of England would be to lay
a cable herself, for her own sole and exclusive benefit. Then she
would not only have the control, but would be unrestrained by any
treaty-obligations binding her to respect the neutrality of the
telegraph. We should then find this great medium of communication
between the two hemispheres, which we might have made, if not an ally,
at least a neutral, turned into a powerful antagonist.

Would it not, therefore, be better that such a line of telegraph should
be constructed by the joint efforts of both countries, and be guarded
by treaty-stipulations, so that it might be placed, as far as possible,
under the protection of the faith of nations, and of the honor of the
civilized world?

Mr. Field says, that, in the negotiations on this subject, Great Britain
has never shown the slightest wish to take advantage of its geographical
position to exact special privileges, or a desire to appropriate any
advantages which it was not willing to concede equally to the United
States.

Should not the Atlantic telegraph, if laid down under the conditions
proposed by the Company, instead of being a cause of apprehension, in
case of war, be rather looked upon with favor, as tending to lessen
the risk of war between the United States and all European countries,
affording, as it would, facilities for the prompt interchange of notes
between the Government of the United States and those of the various
nations on the other side of the Atlantic, whenever any misunderstanding
should unha