The President may have argued,
(1,) that the American mind had been brought up to the point of
emancipation under certain well-defined conditions, and that, if he
should not avail himself of the state of opinion, the opportunity
afforded him might pass away, never to return with equal force; (2,)
that foreign nations might base acknowledgment of the Confederacy on the
defeats experienced by our armies in the last days of August, on the
danger of Washington, and on the advance of Rebel armies to the Ohio,
and he was determined that they should, if admitting the Confederacy
to national rank, place themselves in the position of supporters of
slavery; and, (3,) that the successes won by our army in Maryland,
considering the disgraceful business at Harper's Ferry, were not of that
pronounced character which entitles us to assert any supremacy over the
enemy as soldiers. Something like this would seem to be the process
through which President Lincoln arrived at the sound conclusion that the
hour had come to strike a heavy blow at the enemy, and that he was the
man for the hour.

Thus much for the Proclamation itself, the appearance of which indicates
the beginning of a new period in the Secession contest, and shows that
the American people are capable of conquering their prejudices, provided
their schooling shall be sufficiently severe and costly. But the
Proclamation itself, and without any change in our military policy,
cannot be expected to accomplish anything for the Federal cause. Its
doctrines must be enforced, if there is to be any practical effect from
the change of position taken by the country and the President. If the
same want of capacity that has hitherto characterized the war on our
part is to be exhibited hereafter, the Proclamation might as well have
been levelled against the evils of intemperance as against the evils
of slavery. Never, since war began, has there been such imbecility
displayed in waging it as we have contrived to display in our attacks on
the enemies of the Union. It used to be supposed that Austria was the
slowest and the most stupid of military countries; but America has
got ahead of Austria in the art of doing nothing--or worse than
nothing--with myriads of men and millions of money. We stand before the
world a people to whom military success seems seldom possible, and,
when possible, rarely useful. If we win a victory, we spend weeks in
contemplating its beauties, and never think of improv