ealous of commercial
supremacy, has been determined to deny her these, and, if possible, to
crush her; that she (Germany) has lived in perpetual fear and panic;
and that if in this case she has been the first to strike, it has only
been because to wait England's opportunity would have been to court
defeat. Allowing for the exaggerations inseparable from opposed points
of view, is there not some justification for this plea? England, who
plunged into the Crimean War in order to _prevent_ Russia from obtaining
a seaboard and her natural commercial expansion, and who afterwards
joined with Russia in order to plunder Persia and to prevent Germany
from getting her railways along the Persian Gulf; who calmly
appropriated Egypt, with its valuable cottonlands and market; who, at
the behest of a group of capitalists and financiers, turned her great
military machine on a little nation of Boer farmers in South Africa;
who, it is said,[9] sold 300,000 tons of coal to Russia to aid her fleet
against Japan, and at the same time furnished Japan with gold at a high
rate of interest for use against Russia--what trust can be placed in
her? "England," says Bernhardi, "in spite of all her pretences of a
liberal and philanthropic policy, has never sought any other object
than personal advantage and the unscrupulous suppression of her rivals."
Let us hope that this "never" is _too_ harsh; let us at least say
"hardly ever"; but still, are we not compelled to admit that if the rise
of commercial ambition in Germany has figured as a danger to _us_, our
far greater commercial ambitions have not only figured as a danger to
Germany, but, in conjunction with our alliance with France and Russia,
her ancient foes, may well have led to a state of positive panic among
her people? And if, as the Allies would doubtless say, there was really
no need for any such panic, the situation was obviously sufficiently
grave to be easily made use of by a military class for its own ends, or
by an armaments ring or a clique of financiers for theirs. Indeed, it
would be interesting to know what enormous profits Kruppism (to use H.G.
Wells' expressive term) _has_ already made out of this world-madness.
Nor can it be denied that the commercial interest in England, if not
deliberately intending to provoke war with Germany, has not been at all
sorry to seize this opportunity of laying a rival Power low--if only in
order to snatch the said rival's trade. That, indeed, the dai