d have dictated most insulting terms to Servia, and then
refused to accept Servia's most humble apology, is difficult to
understand. The only natural explanation is that the Germanic Powers on
the whole thought it best, even as matters stood, to precipitate war;
that notwithstanding all the complications, they thought that the
long-prepared-for hour had come. The German White Book puts the matter
as a mere _necessity_ of self-defence. "Had the Servians been allowed,
with the help of Russia and France, to endanger the integrity of the
neighbouring Monarchy much longer, the consequence must have been the
gradual disruption of Austria and the subjection of the whole Slav
world to the Russian sceptre, with the result that the position of the
German race in Central Europe would have become untenable"; but it is
obvious that this plea is itself untenable, since it makes a quite
distant and problematic danger the excuse for a sudden and insulting
blow--for a blow, in fact, almost certain to precipitate the danger! How
the matter was decided in Berlin we cannot at present tell, or what the
motives exactly were. It seems rather probable that the Kaiser threw his
weight on the side of peace. The German Executive at any rate saw that
the great war they had so long contemplated and so long prepared for was
close upon them--only in an unexpected form, hugely complicated and
threatening. They must have realized the great danger of the situation,
but they very likely may have thought that by another piece of bluff
similar to that of 1908-9 they might intimidate Russia a second time;
and they believed that Russia was behindhand in her military
preparations. They also, it appears, thought that England would not
fight, being too much preoccupied with Ireland, India, and other
troubles. And so it may have seemed that Now was the psychological
moment.

Austria opened with war on Servia (28th of July), and the next day
Russia declared a considerable though not complete mobilization. From
that moment a general conflagration was practically inevitable. The news
of Russia's warlike movement caused a perfect panic in Berlin. The
tension of feeling swung round completely for the time being from enmity
against England and France to fear of Russia. The final mobilization of
the Russian troops (31st of July) was followed by the telegrams between
the Kaiser and the Tsar, and by the formal mobilization (really already
complete) of the German Army and