y might treat France like a country conquered
by the emigrants. The people determined to free themselves from a
Government which seemed resolved to trample on all that was dear to
France. In this state of things some looked upon Bonaparte as a
liberator, but the greater number regarded him as an instrument. In this
last character he was viewed by the old Republicans, and by a new
generation, who thought they caught a glimpse of liberty in promises, and
Who were blind enough to believe that the idol of France would be
restored by Napoleon.

In February 1815, while everything was preparing at Elba for the
approaching departure of Napoleon, Murat applied to the Court of Vienna
for leave to march through the Austrian Provinces of Upper Italy an army
directed on France. It was on the 26th of the same month that Bonaparte
escaped from Elba. These two facts were necessarily connected together,
for, in spite of Murat's extravagant ideas, he never could have
entertained the expectation of obliging the King of France, by the mere
force of arms, to acknowledge his continued possession of the throne of
Naples. Since the return of Louis XVIII. the Cabinet of the Tuileries
had never regarded Murat in any other light than as a usurper, and I know
from good authority that the French Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of
Vienna were especially instructed to insist that the restoration of the
throne of Naples in favour of the Bourbons of the Two Sicilies should be
a consequence of the restoration of the throne of France. I also know
that the proposition was firmly opposed on the part of Austria, who had
always viewed with jealousy the occupation of three thrones of Europe by
the single House of Bourbon.

According to information, for the authenticity of which I can vouch, the
following were the plans which Napoleon conceived at Elba. Almost
immediately after his arrival in France he was to order the Marshals on
whom he could best rely to defend to the utmost the entrances to the
French territory and the approaches to Paris, by pivoting on the triple
line of fortresses which gird the north and east of France. Davoust was
'in petto' singled out for the defence of Paris. He, was to arm the
inhabitants of the suburbs, and to have, besides, 20,000 men of the
National Guard at his disposal. Napoleon, not being aware of the
situation of the Allies, never supposed that they could concentrate their
forces and march against him so speedily as they