etter called for the adoption of some decided measures, and I asked him
what had been done. He answered, "I immediately sent a copy of the
letter to M. d'Andre, that he might give orders for arresting the
individual to whom it was addressed."

Having had the opportunity of closely observing the machinery of a
vigilant and active Government, I was, I must confess, not a little
amazed at the insufficiency of the measures adopted to defeat this
well-planned conspiracy. When M. de Blacas informed me of all that had
been done, I could not repress an exclamation of surprise. "Well," said
he, "and what would you have done?"--"In the first place I would not
have lost twenty-four hours, which were an age in such a crisis." I
then explained the plan I would have adopted. A quarter of an hour
after the receipt of the letter I would have sent trustworthy men to
Grenoble, and above all things I would have taken care not to let the
matter fall into the hands of the police. Having obtained all
information from the correspondent at Grenoble, I would have made him
write a letter to his correspondent at Elba to quiet the eagerness of
Napoleon, telling him that the movement of troops he spoke of had not
been made, that it would take eight days to carry it out, and that it
was necessary to the success of the enterprise to delay the embarkation
for some days. While Bonaparte was thus delayed I would have sent to
the coast of Provence a sufficient body of men devoted to the Royal
cause, sending off in another direction the regiments whose chiefs were
gained over by Napoleon, as the correspondence should reveal their
names. "You are perhaps right, sir," said M. de Blacas, "but what could
I do? I am new here. I had not the control of the police, and I
trusted to M. d'Andre."--"Well," said I, "Bonaparte will be here on the
20th of March." With these words I parted from M. de Blacas. I
remarked a great change in him. He had already lost a vast deal of that
hauteur of favouritism which made him so much disliked.

When I entered upon my duties in the Prefecture of Police the evil was
already past remedy. The incorrigible emigres required another lesson,
and the temporary resurrection of the Empire was inevitable. But, if
Bonaparte was recalled, it was not owing to any attachment to him
personally; it was not from any fidelity to the recollections of the
Empire. It was resolved at any price to get rid of those imbecile
councillors, who thought the