persons
to the Allied army for the purpose of proposing peace. These proceedings
were, however, rendered of little importance by the resolution of the
victors to advance to Paris.

Napoleon's behaviour just before and immediately after the crisis is well
described by Lavallette. "The next day," he observes, "I returned to the
Emperor. He had received the most positive accounts of the state of
feeling in the Chamber of Representatives. The reports had, however,
been given to him with some little reserve, for he did not seem to me
convinced that the resolution was really formed to pronounce his
abdication, I was better informed on the matter, and I came to him
without having the least doubt in my mind that the only thing he could do
was to descend once more from the throne. I communicated to him all the
particulars I had just received, and I did not hesitate to advise him to
follow the only course worthy of him. He listened to me with a sombre
air, and though he was in some measure master of himself, the agitation
of his mind and the sense of his position betrayed themselves in his face
and in all his motions. 'I know,' said I, 'that your Majesty may still
keep the sword drawn, but with whom, and against whom? Defeat has
chilled the courage of every one; the army is still in the greatest
confusion. Nothing is to be expected from Paris, and the coup d'etat of
the 18th Brumaire cannot be renewed.'--'That thought,' he replied,
stopping, 'is far from my mind. I will hear nothing more about myself.
But poor France!' At that moment Savary and Caulaincourt entered, and
having drawn a faithful picture of the exasperation of the Deputies, they
persuaded him to assent to abdication. Some words he uttered proved to
us that he would have considered death preferable to that step; but still
he took it.

"The great act of abdication being performed, he remained calm during the
whole day, giving his advice on the position the army should take, and on
the manner in which the negotiations with the enemy ought to be
conducted. He insisted especially on the necessity of proclaiming his
son Emperor, not so much for the advantage of the child as with a view to
concentrate all the power of sentiments and affections. Unfortunately,
nobody would listen to him. Some men of sense and courage rallied found
that proposition in the two Chambers, but fear swayed the majority; and
among those who remained free from it many thought that a public
decla