orces
being hastily raised, but he chafed in his position; and it is
characteristic of him that Napoleon was eventually forced to send him the
most formal orders before the surly Minister would carry out the
Emperor's unlucky intention of giving a command to Bourmont, whom Davoust
strongly and rightly suspected of treachery. When Napoleon left the
capital Davoust became its governor, and held his post unmoved by the
intrigues of the Republicans and the Royalists. When Napoleon returned
from the great disaster Davoust gave his voice for the only wise
policy,--resistance and the prorogation of the factious Chambers. On the
abdication of Napoleon the Provisional Government necessarily gave
Davoust the command of the army which was concentrated round Paris.

If Davoust had restricted himself less closely to his duty as a soldier,
if he had taken more on himself, with the 100,000 men he soon had under
him, he might have saved France from much of her subsequent humiliation,
or at least he might have preserved the lives of Ney and of the brave men
whom the Bourbons afterwards butchered. Outwitted by Fouche, and
unwilling to face the hostility of the Chambers, Davoust at last
consented to the capitulation of Paris, though he first gave the Prussian
cavalry a sharp lesson. While many of his comrades were engaged in the
great struggle for favour or safety, the stern Marshal gave up his
Ministry, and, doing the last service in his power to France, stopped all
further useless bloodshed by withdrawing the army, no easy task in their
then humour, behind the Loire, where he kept what the Royalists called
the "Brigands of the Loire" in subjection till relieved by Macdonald.
He was the only one of the younger Marshals who had not been tried in
Spain, and so far he was fortunate; but, though he was not popular with
the army, his character and services seem to point him out as the most
fit of all the Marshals for an independent command. Had Napoleon been
successful in 1812, Davoust was to have received the Viceroyalty of
Poland; and he would probably have left a higher name in history than the
other men placed by Napoleon to rule over his outlying kingdoms. In any
case it was fortunate for France and for the Allies that a man of his
character ruled the army after Napoleon abdicated; there would otherwise
have been wild work round Paris, as it was only with the greatest
difficulty and by the force of his authority and example that Davoust