on discovered that they were fresh-water seamen. I then
recollected that there were English prisoners in the barracks, and
ordered that some of the oldest and best seamen among them should be
brought before me to the banks of the river. The waters were very high,
and the current rapid and dangerous. I asked them if they could join a
number of boats together so that I might pass over. They answered that
it was possible, but hazardous. I desired them to set about it
instantly. In the course of a few hours they succeeded in effecting what
the others had pronounced to be impossible, and I crossed before the
evening was over. I ordered those who had worked at it to receive a sum
of money each, a suit of clothes, and their liberty. Marchand was with
me at the time."

In December 1816 Las Cases was compelled to leave St. Helena. He had
written a letter to Lucien Bonaparte, and entrusted it to a mulatto
servant to be forwarded to Europe. He was detected; and as he was thus
endeavouring to carry on (contrary to the regulations of the island) a
clandestine correspondence with Europe, Las Cases and his son were sent
off, first to the Cape and then to England, where they were only allowed
to land to be sent to Dover and shipped off to Ostend.

Not long after their arrival at St. Helena, Madame Bertrand gave birth to
a son, and when Napoleon went to visit her she said, "I have the honour
of presenting to your Majesty the first French subject who has entered
Longwood without the permission of Lord Bathurst."

It has been generally supposed that Napoleon was a believer in the
doctrine of predestination. The following conversation with Las Cases
clearly decides that point. "Pray," said he, "am I not thought to be
given to a belief in predestination?"--"Yes, Sire; at least by many
people."--"Well, well! let them say what they please, one may sometimes
be tempted to set a part, and it may occasionally be useful. But what
are men? How much easier is it to occupy their attention and to strike
their imaginations by absurdities than by rational ideas! But can a man
of sound sense listen for one moment to such a doctrine? Either
predestination admits the existence of free-will, or it rejects it.
If it admits it, what kind of predetermined result can that he which a
simple resolution, a step, a word, may alter or modify ad infinitum?
If predestination, on the contrary, rejects the existence of free-will it
is quite another question; in that