conomically.

The statesmen of France, distinguished as they were, certainly did not
rise to a level with the situation either in 1814 or in 1815. In 1814,
it is true, they were almost stunned by the crash of the Empire, and
little as they foresaw the restoration of the Bourbons, still less could
they have anticipated the extraordinary follies which were to be
perpetrated. In 1815 there was less excuse for their helplessness, and,
overawed as they were by the mass of foes which was pouring on them to
complete the disaster of Waterloo, still it is disappointing to find that
there was no one to seize the helm of power, and, confronting the Allies,
to stipulate proper terms for France, and for the brave men who had
fought for her. The Steady Davoust was there with his 100,000 men to add
weight to their language, and the total helplessness of the older line of
the Bourbons had been too evidently displayed to make their return a
certainty, so that there is no reason to doubt that a firm-hearted
patriot might have saved France from much of the degradation and loss
inflicted on her when once the Allies had again got her at their mercy.
At-the least the Bourbons might have been deprived of the revenge they
sought for in taking some of the best blood of France. Better for Ney
and his comrades to have fallen in a last struggle before Paris than to
be shot by Frenchmen emboldened by the presence of foreign troops.

Talleyrand, the most prominent figure among the statesmen, was away. His
absence at Vienna during the first Restoration was undoubtedly the cause
of many of the errors then committed. His ability as displayed under
Napoleon has been much exaggerated, for, as the Duke of Wellington said,
it was easy enough to be Foreign Minister to a Government in military
possession of Europe, but at least he was above the petty trivialities
and absurdities of the Bourbon' Court. On the receipt of the news of the
landing of Napoleon he really seems to have believed that the enterprise
would immediately end in disaster, and he pressed on the outlawing of the
man who had overwhelmed him with riches, and who had, at the worst, left
him when in disgrace in quiet possession of all his ill-gotten wealth.
But, as the power of Napoleon became more and more displayed, as perhaps
Talleyrand found that the Austrians were not quite so firm as they wished
to be considered, and as he foresaw the possible chances of the Orleans
family, he became rathe