lked together on the terrace of Cairo and mutually
deplored the death of young Sulkowski. Had Sulkowski lived Napoleon's
favourable intentions with respect to Poland might perhaps have been
confirmed. A fact which explains to me the coolness, I may almost say
the indifference, of Bonaparte to the resurrection of Poland is that the
commencement of the Consulate was the period at which that measure
particularly occupied his attention. How often did he converse on the
subject with me and other persons who may yet recollect his sentiments!
It was the topic on which he most loved to converse, and on which he
spoke with feeling and enthusiasm. In the 'Moniteur' of the period here
alluded to I could point out more than one article without signature or
official character which Napoleon dictated to me, and the insertion of
which in that journal, considering the energy of certain expressions,
sufficiently proves that they could have emanated from none but
Bonaparte. It was usually in the evening that he dictated to me these
articles. Then, when the affairs of the day were over, he would launch
into the future, and give free scope to his vast projects. Some of these
articles were characterised by so little moderation that the First Consul
would very often destroy them in the morning, smiling at the violent
ebullitions of the preceding night. At other times I took the liberty of
not sending them to the 'Moniteur' on the night on which they were
dictated, and though he might earnestly wish their insertion I adduced
reasons good or bad, to account for the delay. He would then read over
the article in question, and approve of my conduct; but he would
sometimes add, "It is nevertheless true that with an independent Kingdom
of Poland, and 150,000 disposable troops in the east of France, I should
always be master of Russia, Prussia, and Austria."--"General," I would
reply," I am entirely of your opinion; but wherefore awaken the
suspicions of the interested parties. Leave all to time and
circumstances."

The reader may have to learn, and not, perhaps, without some surprise,
that in the protocol of the sittings of the Congress of Chatillon
Napoleon put forward the spoliation of Poland by the three principal
powers allied against him as a claim to a more advantageous peace, and to
territorial indemnities for France. In policy he was right, but the
report of foreign cannon was already loud enough to drown the best of
arguments.

After the