it represents, and so on. A wagon is not
perceived when all its parts are summed up; it is the characteristic
connection of the parts which makes it a wagon. And these connections
are not those of mere physical juxtaposition; they involve connection
with the animals that draw it, the things that are carried on it, and so
on. Judgment is employed in the perception; otherwise the perception is
mere sensory excitation or else a recognition of the result of a prior
judgment, as in the case of familiar objects.

Words, the counters for ideals, are, however, easily taken for ideas.
And in just the degree in which mental activity is separated from active
concern with the world, from doing something and connecting the doing
with what is undergone, words, symbols, come to take the place of ideas.
The substitution is the more subtle because some meaning is recognized.
But we are very easily trained to be content with a minimum of meaning,
and to fail to note how restricted is our perception of the relations
which confer significance. We get so thoroughly used to a kind of
pseudo-idea, a half perception, that we are not aware how half-dead
our mental action is, and how much keener and more extensive our
observations and ideas would be if we formed them under conditions of
a vital experience which required us to use judgment: to hunt for the
connections of the thing dealt with. There is no difference of opinion
as to the theory of the matter. All authorities agree that that
discernment of relationships is the genuinely intellectual matter;
hence, the educative matter. The failure arises in supposing that
relationships can become perceptible without experience--without that
conjoint trying and undergoing of which we have spoken. It is assumed
that "mind" can grasp them if it will only give attention, and that this
attention may be given at will irrespective of the situation. Hence
the deluge of half-observations, of verbal ideas, and unassimilated
"knowledge" which afflicts the world. An ounce of experience is better
than a ton of theory simply because it is only in experience that any
theory has vital and verifiable significance. An experience, a very
humble experience, is capable of generating and carrying any amount of
theory (or intellectual content), but a theory apart from an experience
cannot be definitely grasped even as theory. It tends to become a mere
verbal formula, a set of catchwords used to render thinking, or genuine