tter to desired results. It is antithetical to random and
ill-considered action,--ill-considered signifying ill-adapted.
The statement that method means directed movement of subject matter
towards ends is formal. An illustration may give it content. Every
artist must have a method, a technique, in doing his work. Piano playing
is not hitting the keys at random. It is an orderly way of using them,
and the order is not something which exists ready-made in the musician's
hands or brain prior to an activity dealing with the piano. Order is
found in the disposition of acts which use the piano and the hands and
brain so as to achieve the result intended. It is the action of the
piano directed to accomplish the purpose of the piano as a musical
instrument. It is the same with "pedagogical" method. The only
difference is that the piano is a mechanism constructed in advance for
a single end; while the material of study is capable of indefinite uses.
But even in this regard the illustration may apply if we consider the
infinite variety of kinds of music which a piano may produce, and
the variations in technique required in the different musical results
secured. Method in any case is but an effective way of employing some
material for some end.
These considerations may be generalized by going back to the conception
of experience. Experience as the perception of the connection between
something tried and something undergone in consequence is a process.
Apart from effort to control the course which the process takes, there
is no distinction of subject matter and method. There is simply an
activity which includes both what an individual does and what the
environment does. A piano player who had perfect mastery of his
instrument would have no occasion to distinguish between his
contribution and that of the piano. In well-formed, smooth-running
functions of any sort,--skating, conversing, hearing music, enjoying a
landscape,--there is no consciousness of separation of the method of the
person and of the subject matter. In whole-hearted play and work there
is the same phenomenon.
When we reflect upon an experience instead of just having it, we
inevitably distinguish between our own attitude and the objects toward
which we sustain the attitude. When a man is eating, he is eating food.
He does not divide his act into eating and food. But if he makes a
scientific investigation of the act, such a discrimination is the first
thing he w
|