ill draw the attention of Senor Paterno to two
things, viz.:

1. That he _commits an injustice in imputing to the North Americans
the intention of taking possession of these Islands_ as soon as we
have conquered the Spaniards, for, besides having no grounds on
which to make such an allegation against a nation distinguished
for its humanity like the Federal Republic, there is the fact
that _its own constitution prohibits the absorption of territory
outside America, _in accordance with that principle laid down
by the immortal Monroe, of America for the Americans. There is,
moreover, the historical antecedent that the independence of
South America, once under Spanish dominion, is largely due to
the protection of the United States; and

2. That Senor Paterno should reflect on the fact that the Spaniards
would never have allowed him to publish his _Manifiesto_ had it not
been for the existence and attitude of our Dictator, Don Emilio
Aguinaldo. This ought to serve Senor Paterno as further proof of
the cowardice of the Spaniards, who, notwithstanding all that has
been shown, insist on creating discord by provoking civil war:
on their heads will fall the responsibilities of the moment and
of the historical past.

_Cavite_, _9th of June_, 1898.

_The Revolutionists_.

The feeling against Don Pedro A. Paterno in the rebel camp was very
strong for the time being, because of his supposed complicity in the
alleged Biac-na-bato fraud.

The rebels stopped all the traffic on the Tondo-Malabon steam tramway
line, and shortly afterwards the Manila-Dagupan railway trains had
temporarily to cease running.

On June 10, 1898, General Monet received, through a Chinaman,
a message from the Gov.-General to hasten to Manila with all
the force he could bring. Monet had been so long in the northern
provinces unsuccessfully trying to hold them against the rebels
that his fate was, for a time, despaired of in the capital. Hemmed
in on all sides by the enemy, concentration of all his detachments
for general retreat was impossible. The forces spread over Tarlac,
North Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija had to be left to their fate; their
junction was quite impracticable, for, surrounded everywhere by
the enemy, each group was then only just able to defend itself, and
subsequently most of them fell prisoners. With only 600 fighting men,
escorting 80 wounded,