s. There was no American plenipotentiary empowered to make
any political compact with the Islanders. At that date there was
neither a Philippine policy nor any fixed programme regarding the
future disposal of the Islands, and whatever naval, military, or other
officers might have said to Aguinaldo was said on their own private
responsibility, and could in no way affect the action of the American
Government. Without any training in or natural bent for diplomacy,
Aguinaldo had not the faintest idea of what foreign "protection"
signified. He thought that after the capture of Manila the Americans
would sail away and leave the Filipinos to themselves, and only
reappear if any other Power interfered with their native government.

Admiral Dewey had a double task to perform. He had to destroy the
Spanish fleet, and to co-operate in the taking of Manila. In the
destruction of the fleet the attitude of the natives was of little
concern to him. In the taking of the capital it was important to know
what part the natives would play. It was certain they would not be
placid spectators of the struggle, wherever Aguinaldo might be. If
they _must_ enter into it, it was desirable to have them led by one who
could control them and repress excesses. It would have been better for
the Americans if, pending the issue with the Spaniards, no third party
had existed; but, as it did exist, both contending nations were anxious
for its goodwill or its control. Therefore Admiral Dewey's recognition
of Aguinaldo as a factor in the hostilities was nothing more nor
less than a legitimate stratagem to facilitate his operations against
the Spaniards. Dewey simply neutralized a possible adverse force by
admissible military artifice, and Aguinaldo was too ingenuous to see
that he was being outwitted. The fighting section of the Filipinos
was intensely irritated at not having been allowed to enter and sack
the capital. They had looked forward to it as the crowning act of
victory. The general mass of the christianized Islanders hoped that
Philippine independence would immediately follow the capitulation
of Manila, although, in the capital itself, natives of position
and property evinced little enthusiasm for the insurgents' triumph,
whilst some inwardly doubted it. In September a native lawyer, Felipe
Agoncillo, was sent to Washington to lay the Filipinos' case before the
President in the hope of gaining his personal support of their claims
(_vide_ p. 472). T