d to
the Philippine people on the 12th of June. Lastly, all this was
confirmed by the American General Merritt himself, predecessor
of General Otis, in his Manifesto to the Philippine people some
days before he demanded the surrender of Manila from the Spanish
General Jaudenes. In that Manifesto it is distinctly stated that
the naval and field forces of the United States had come to give
us our liberty, by subverting the bad Spanish Government. And I
hereby protest against this unexpected act of the United States
claiming sovereignty over these Islands. My relations with the
American authorities prove undeniably that the United States did
not bring me over here from Hong-Kong to make war on the Spaniards
for their benefit, but for the purpose of our own liberty and
independence. . . .

_Emilio Aguinaldo_.

Aguinaldo having been successively Dictator and President of the
Revolutionary Government (_vide_ p. 448), now assumed the new title of
President of the _Philippine Republic_, the Articles of Constitution
of which (drawn up by his Prime Minister Apolinario Mabini) were
dated January 21, 1899, and promulgated by him on the following
day. In due course the news came that the date of voting in the
Senate for or against the retention of the Islands was fixed. The
Americans already in the Colony were practically unanimous in their
desire for its retention, and every effort was made by them to that
end. The question of the treaty ratification was warmly discussed
in Washington. A week before the vote was taken it was doubtful
whether the necessary two-thirds majority could be obtained. It was
a remarkable coincidence that just when the Republican Party was
straining every nerve to secure the two or three wavering votes, the
first shots were exchanged between a native and an American outpost
in the suburbs of the capital. Each side accuses the other of having
precipitated hostilities. However that may be, this event took place
precisely at a date when the news of it in Washington served to secure
the votes of the hesitating senators in favour of retention. [208]
The provocative demeanour of the insurgents at the outposts was
such that a rupture was inevitable sooner or later, and if a Senate
vote of abandonment had come simultaneously with insurrection, the
situation would have been extremely complicated; it would have been
difficult for the Oriental not to have