ity, succeeded him in command. He was a man of the Duke of
Alba type--the ideal of the traditional Spanish Colonial party who
recognized no colonists' rights, and regarded concessions of liberty
to the colonies as maternal dispensations to be hoped for only,
but never demanded. Antonio Canovas, the ultra-Conservative Prime
Minister, had declared that so long as an armed rebel remained in
the field he would not grant reforms, so the prospect of a settlement
of the disputes between the Government and the governed was hopeless
during that administration. The duration of the civil war had seriously
prejudiced American trade interests; the pursuance of a conflict under
the conditions imposed by General Weyler, who caused all non-combatant
Islanders to be "concentrated" in places where they were left to
starve, aroused the just indignation of America and Europe alike. The
hand of the assassin brought the Canovas Ministry to an end on August
8, 1897; General Weyler was recalled six weeks later, and the United
States Government, which had so repeatedly protested against the
indefinite and wanton waste of lives and fortune in Cuba, dictated to
Spain a limit to its continuance. After a Conservative interregnum
of six weeks under the leadership of General Marcelo Azarraga,
Praxedes Sagasta came into power at the head of a Liberal ministry
and with a Cuban autonomy bill in his portfolio. The newly-appointed
Gov.-General, Ramon Blanco, Marquis de Pena Plata, ex-Gov.-General
of the Philippines (_vide_ p. 377)--a more noble and compassionate
man than his predecessor--unsuccessfully essayed the policy of
coercing the rebels in arms whilst cajoling peaceful autonomists and
separatists with the long-talked-of self-government. Nevertheless,
the separatist movement had in no way abated when the Autonomy Bill was
promulgated, and an insular Cuban Government was formed on January 1,
1898. In the meantime the incident of the blowing-up of the American
warship _Maine_, the cause of which has not yet been made clear to
the satisfaction of the world, had further incensed the war party
in the United States. [191] Autonomy had come too late; examined in
detail it was but another form of Spanish dominion, open to almost
similar abuses; it was not the will of the people, and it failed
to bring peace. The thousands "concentrated" under Weyler's rule
still formed a moribund mass of squalid misery which Spain was still
unable or unwilling to relieve. Am