A wiser government would have learnt a lesson from a sixteen-months'
rebellion and have afterwards removed its causes, if only to ensure
the mother country's sovereignty. The probability of the Filipinos
being able to subvert Spanish rule by their own unaided efforts was
indeed remote, but a review of Spanish colonial history ought to
have suggested to the legislators that that extraneous assistance to
sedition which promoted emancipation in the former Spanish-American
territories might one day be extended to the Filipinos.

The publication of the above documents, however, did little to calm
the anger of the Madrid politicians who maintained that Spanish
dominion in the Philippines could only be peacefully assured by a
certain measure of reform in consonance with the natives' aspirations.

Months afterwards, when Spanish sovereignty in the Archipelago
was drawing to a close, the Conde de las Almenas opened a furious
debate in the Senate, charging all the Colonial Govs.-General with
incompetency, but its only immediate effect was to widen the breach
between political parties.

CHAPTER XXIII

The Tagalog Rebellion of 1896-98
Second Period
American Intervention

The prelude to the American occupation of Manila was the demand made
on Spain by the Government of the United States of America to evacuate
the Island of Cuba.

Generations of Spanish misrule in that Island had produced a recurrence
of the many attempts to throw off the sovereignty of Spain. In
February, 1895, the flag of insurrection was again unfurled, and at
Baira a proclamation, claiming independence, was issued at the instance
of one of Cuba's most intelligent patriots--Marti. This civil leader,
however, died a natural death a few months afterwards, but the chief
command of the insurgents in the field was continued by the mulatto
Antonio Maceo. The rebellion was assuming a serious aspect when General
Martinez Campos, who had been instrumental in duping the Cubans in
1878 by the Treaty of Zanjon, was again sent out as Captain-General
of the Island. But the Cubans refused to be caught a second time in
the same trap. Martinez Campos' theme of "political action combined
with military force" held no weight. During his mild _regime_ the
insurrection increased rapidly, and in one encounter he himself was
very near falling a prisoner. In eight months he was relieved of his
post, and General Weyler, Marquis de Teneriffe, who had a reputation
for sever