"with horror from the thought of civil war between
the North and the South."

It must always be remembered that the disbelief in ultimate secession
was nearly universal throughout the free States. The people of
the North could not persuade themselves that the proceedings in
the Southern States would lead to any thing more serious than
hostile demonstrations, which would end, after coaxing and compromise,
in a return to the Union. But with this hope of final security
there was, on the part of the great mass of the people in the free
States, the gravest solicitude throughout the winter of 1860-61,
and a restless waiting and watching for a solution of the troubles.
Partisan leaders were busy on both sides seeking for an advantage
that might survive the pending trials. Northern Democrats in many
instances sought to turn the occasion to one of political advantage
by pointing out the lamentable condition to which anti-slavery
agitation had brought the country. This was naturally answered by
Republicans with defiance, and with an affected contempt and
carelessness of what the South might do. Much that was written
and much that was spoken throughout the North during that winter,
both by Democrats and Republicans, would have remained unwritten
and unspoken if they had realized the seriousness and magnitude of
the impending calamity.

FINAL ESTIMATE OF MR. BUCHANAN.

In a final analysis and true estimate of Mr. Buchanan's conduct in
the first stages of the revolt, the condition of the popular mind
as just described must be taken into account. The same influences
and expectations that wrought upon the people were working also
upon him. There were indeed two Mr. Buchanans in the closing months
of the administration. The first was Mr. Buchanan of November and
December, angered by the decision of the Presidential election and
more than willing that the North, including his own State, should
be disciplined by fright to more conservative views and to a stricter
observance of what he considered solemn obligations imposed by the
Constitution. If the Southern threat of resistance to the authority
of the Union had gone no farther than this, Mr. Buchanan would have
been readily reconciled to its temporary violence, and would probably
have considered it a national blessing in disguise.--The second
was Mr. Buchanan of January and February, appalled by surrounding
and increasing peril