re characteristic of the Deity, so
freedom is the mark of the created spirit.[760] In this thesis Origen
goes beyond the assumption of the heretical Gnostics just as much as he
does in his other proposition that the creaturely spirit is in no sense
a portion of the divine (because it is changeable[761]); but in reality
freedom, as he understands it, is only the capacity of created spirits
to determine their own destiny _for a time_. In the end, however, they
must turn to that which is good, because everything spiritual is
indestructible. _Sub specie aeternitatis_, then, the mere communication
of the divine element to the created spirit[762] is _not_ a mere
communication, and freedom is no freedom; but the absolute necessity of
the created spirit's developing itself merely appears as freedom. Yet
Origen himself did not draw this conclusion, but rather based everything
on his conception that the freedom of _naturae rationabiles_ consisted in
the _possibilitas utriusque_, and sought to understand the cosmos, as it
is, from this freedom. To the _naturae rationabiles_, which have
different _species_ and _ordines_, human souls also belong. The whole of
them were created from all eternity; for God would not be almighty
unless he had always produced everything[763]; in virtue of their origin
they are equal, for their original community with the Logos permits of
no diversity[764]; but, on the other hand, they have received different
tasks and their development is consequently different. In so far as they
are spirits subject to change, they are burdened with a kind of bodily
nature,[765] for it is only the Deity that is without a body. The
element of materiality is a necessary result of their finite nature,
that is, of their being created; and this applies both to angels and
human souls.[766] Now Origen did not speculate at all as to how the
spirit world might have developed in ideal fashion, a fact which it is
exceedingly important to recognise; he knows nothing at all about an
ideal development for all, and does not even view it as a possibility.
The truth rather is that as soon as he mentions the _naturae
rationabiles_, he immediately proceeds to speak of their fall, their
growth, and their diversities. He merely contemplates them in the given
circumstances in which they are placed (see the exposition in [Greek:
peri archon] II. 9. 2).
THE DOCTRINE OF THE FALL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. All created spirits must
develop. When they
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