[Footnote 731: It is very remarkable that Origen [Greek: peri archon] I.
2. 1 in his presentation of the Logos doctrine, started with the person
of Christ, though he immediately abandoned this starting-point "Primo
illud nos oportere scire", so this chapter begins, "Quod aliud est in
Christo deitatis eius natura, quod est unigenitus filius patris, et alia
humana natura, quam in novissimis temporibus pro dispensatione suscepit.
Propter quod videndum primo est, quid sit unigenitus filius dei."]

[Footnote 732: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 2, 6.]

[Footnote 733: The expression was familiar to Origen as to Justin (see
Dial. c. Tryph). See c. Cels. V. 39: [Greek: Kai deuteron oun legomen
Theon istosan, hoti ton deuteron Theon ouk allo ti legomen, he ten
periektiken pason areton areten kai ton periektikon pantos houtinosoun
logou ton kata physin kai proegoumenos gegenemenon.]]

[Footnote 734: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 13 has been much corrupted by
Rufinus. The passage must have been to the effect that the Son is indeed
[Greek: agathos], but not, like the Father, [Greek: aparallaktos
agathos].]

[Footnote 735: Selecta in Psalm., Lomm. XIII., p. 134; see also Fragm.
comm. in ep. ad Hebr., Lomm. V., p. 299 sq.]

[Footnote 736: L.c.: "Sic et sapientia ex deo procedens, ex ipsa
substantia dei generatur. Sic nihilominus et secundum similitudinem
corporalis aporrhoeae esse dicitur aporrhoea gloriae omnipotentis pura
quaedam et sincera. Quae utraeque similitudines (see the beginning of the
passage) manifestissime ostendunt communionem substantiae esse filio cum
patre. Aporrhoea enim [Greek: homoousios] videtur, id est, unius
substantiae cum illo corpore, ex quo est vel aporrhoea vel vapor." In
opposition to Heracleon Origen argues (in Joh. XIII. 25., Lomm. II., p.
43 sq.) that _we_ are not homousios with God: [Greek: epistesomen de, ei
me sphodra estin asebes homoousios te agenneto physei kai pammakaria
einai legein tous proskunountas en pneumati to Theo.] On the meaning of
[Greek: homoousios] see Zahn, Marcell., pp. 11-32. The conception
decidedly excludes the possibility of the two subjects connected by it
having a different essence; but it says nothing about how they came to
have one essence and in what measure they possess it. On the other hand
it abolishes the distinction of persons the moment the essence itself is
identified with the one person. Here then is found the Unitarian danger,
which could only be averted by asse