he value of him who gives up his life. (3) In accordance with this the
death of Christ has also a vicarious signification (see with regard to
both these conceptions the treatise Exhort, ad martyr., as well as c.
Cels. VII. 17: I. 31; in Rom. t. III. 7, 8, Lomm. VI., pp. 196-216
etc.). (4) The death of Christ is to be considered as a ransom paid to
the devil. This view must have been widely diffused in Origen's time; it
readily suggested itself to the popular idea and was further supported
by Marcionite theses. It was also accepted by Origen who united it with
the notion of a deception practised on the devil, a conception first
found among the Basilidians. By his successful temptation the devil
acquired a right over men. This right cannot be destroyed, but only
bought off. God offers the devil Christ's soul in exchange for the souls
of men. This proposal of exchange was, however, insincere, as God knew
that the devil could not keep hold of Christ's soul, because a sinless
soul could not but cause him torture. The devil agreed to the bargain
and was duped. Christ did not fall into the power of death and the
devil, but overcame both. This theory, which Origen propounded in
somewhat different fashion in different places (see Exhort ad martyr.
12; in Matth. t. XVI. 8, Lomm. IV., p. 27; t. XII. 28, Lomm. III., p.
175; t. XIII. 8, 9, Lomm. III., pp. 224-229; in Rom. II. 13, Lomm. VI.,
p. 139 sq. etc.), shows in a specially clear way the conservative method
of this theologian, who would not positively abandon any idea. No doubt
it shows at the same time how uncertain Origen was as to the
applicability of popular conceptions when he was dealing with the sphere
of the Psychici. We must here remember the ancient idea that we are not
bound to sincerity towards our enemies. (5) Christ, the God who became
flesh, is to be considered as high priest and mediator between God and
man (see de Orat. 10, 15). All the above-mentioned conceptions of
Christ's work were, moreover, worked out by Origen in such a way that
his humanity and divinity are necessary inferences from them. In this
case also he is characterised by the same mode of thought as Irenaeus.
Finally, let us remember that Origen adhered as strongly as ever to the
proof from prophecy, and that he also, in not a few instances, regarded
the phrase, "it is written", as a sufficient court of appeal (see, for
example, c. Cels. II. 37). Yet, on the other hand, behind all this he
has a met