asy to foretell.
In the position he had acquired, and with the qualities he had shown,
he would be as dangerous in peace as in war. Coalitions alone could
resist him, and a coalition could only be a work of time and patience.
When the alliance which had opposed him with unequal fortune was
dissolved, a season of peril would ensue, for which no defensive
provision could be made.

The keystone of the situation was the assured inaction of England.
Whilst that lasted, at least while Charles II lived, Lewis would defy
the rest of Europe. He had nothing to fear except the Stadtholder.
Whilst De Witt governed, the French attack was irresistible. But the
Perpetual Edict was repealed, and William of Orange was captain-general
for life. He had saved his country, driven out the French, raised
Europe against them. The merchants of Amsterdam, who, in 1672,
were preparing to sail for Batavia, as the Puritans sailed for New
England, were now the second Power in Europe politically, and
commercially by far the first. William of Orange, to whose
international genius the change was due, stood very near the
succession to the English throne. In the course of nature it would be
his some day, by right of his wife, or by his own. And there was hope
for European independence and the existence of free communities, if
the resources of England passed to William earlier than the resources
of Spain fell into the hands of Lewis. After the peace, that was the
problem of general politics.

The treaties of Nimeguen were far from satisfying the aspirations of
Lewis. He dismissed his foreign minister. Pomponne was the most
honourable man in his service, and had conducted with eminent
dexterity and success the negotiations for the numerous treaties with
every country. Lewis says that he was deficient in the energy and the
greatness requisite in executing the orders of a king of France who
had not been without good fortune. Pomponne came into office in 1671
and left it in 1679, so that he was not compromised by the derisive
claim of devolution, or by the yet more hollow sophistry of reunion,
by which Lewis now proceeded to push his advantage. His dismissal
announced to the nations what they had to look for. It meant that the
profit of Nimeguen was not enough, that the greatness of the French
monarch exacted further sacrifices.

After the peace Lewis kept up his army. There were 112,000 men under
arms, and there were cadres for twice as m