kes the social edifice rest upon the _general will_, no one
has so completely admitted the hypothesis of the entire passiveness of
human nature in the presence of the lawgiver:--
"If it is true that a great prince is a rare thing, how much more
so must a great lawgiver be? The former has only to follow the
pattern proposed to him by the latter. _This latter is the
mechanician who invents the machine_; the former is merely the
workman who sets it in motion."
And what part have men to act in all this? That of the machine, which is
set in motion; or rather, are they not the brute matter of which the
machine is made? Thus, between the legislator and the prince, between
the prince and his subjects, there are the same relations as those which
exist between the agricultural writer and the agriculturist, the
agriculturist and the clod. At what a vast height, then, is the
politician placed, who rules over legislators themselves, and teaches
them their trade in such imperative terms as the following:--
"Would you give consistency to the State? Bring the extremes
together as much as possible. Suffer neither wealthy persons nor
beggars.
"If the soil is poor and barren, or the country too much confined
for the inhabitants, turn to industry and the arts, whose
productions you will exchange for the provisions which you
require.... On a good soil, if _you are short_ of inhabitants, give
all your attention to agriculture, which multiplies men, and
_banish_ the arts, which only serve to depopulate the country....
Pay attention to extensive and convenient coasts. _Cover the sea_
with vessels, and you will have a brilliant and short existence. If
your seas wash only inaccessible rocks, let the people _be
barbarous_, and eat fish; they will live more quietly, perhaps
better, and, most certainly, more happily. In short, besides those
maxims which are common to all, every people has its own particular
circumstances, which demand a legislation peculiar to itself.
"It was thus that the Hebrews formerly, and the Arabs more
recently, had religion for their principal object; that of the
Athenians was literature; that of Carthage and Tyre, commerce; of
Rhodes, naval affairs; of Sparta, war; and of Rome, virtue. The
author of the 'Spirit of Laws' has shown the art _by which the
legislator should frame his i
|