nce. He could persuade
the multitude of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the
rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a boxer should abuse
the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all good
things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to be
deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of the
lessons which they have learned from him.

Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will
quarrel with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he
has fallen, or whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be refuted.
Gorgias declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears that
the argument may be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and
Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points
out the supposed inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to
have fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out of a
misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias
to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or any other
expert. And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of his is
regarded by Gorgias as a happy condition, for he has escaped the trouble
of learning. But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is of
medicine or building? Gorgias is compelled to admit that if he did not
know them previously he must learn them from his teacher as a part of
the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned carpentry is a carpenter,
and he who has learned music is a musician, and he who has learned
justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and rhetoric
is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite of this,
viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may act
unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained?

The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man
may know justice and not be just--here is the old confusion of the arts
and the virtues;--nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly
the bent of natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of
justice, but not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus
is naturally exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect;
of course, he says, the rhetorician, like every one else, will admit
that he knows justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the
interrogations of Socrates?), but he thin