e is
prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked
man and yet happy.

The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers
punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than
if he escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly
deserves refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the
fact. Socrates has only to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who
is the envy of the world, and of the wretch who, having been detected
in a criminal attempt against the state, is crucified or burnt to
death. Socrates replies, that if they are both criminal they are both
miserable, but that the unpunished is the more miserable of the two. At
this Polus laughs outright, which leads Socrates to remark that laughter
is a new species of refutation. Polus replies, that he is already
refuted; for if he will take the votes of the company, he will find
that no one agrees with him. To this Socrates rejoins, that he is not
a public man, and (referring to his own conduct at the trial of the
generals after the battle of Arginusae) is unable to take the suffrages
of any company, as he had shown on a recent occasion; he can only deal
with one witness at a time, and that is the person with whom he is
arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion of any man to do is worse
than to suffer evil.

Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do
evil is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But what
is fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies,
colours, figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined
with reference to pleasure and utility? Polus assents to this latter
doctrine, and is easily persuaded that the fouler of two things must
exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the
suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus doing
is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more hurtful
than suffering.

There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is
punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done
justly is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if
to punish is just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and
therefore beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul is improved.
There are three evils from which a man may suffer, and which affect him
in estate, body, and